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exclusive pleading rule by citing a decision which held that
an insured receives the benefit
ofthe doubt when potential coverage is uncertain from the allegations in the complaint. Id. at
107,651 A.2d at 863-64 (citing
US.F & G. v. Nat. Pav. Co.,
228 Md. 40, 178 A.2d 872
(1962)). The exclusive pleading rule, the court opined, can
often deprive the insured of the
benefit of his bargain in an insurance contract by permitting
the insurer to look exclusively
at the complaint and ignore valid defenses to avoid coverage.
Id. at 110-11,651 A.2d at 865.
The court noted an exception for frivolous defenses

made by the insured solely to
establish an insurer's duty to
defend. Id. at 111-12,651 A.2d
at 866. In combatting potential
abuse, the court limited an insured's use ofextrinsic evidence
to establish a potentiality of
coverage to situations where
the insured can demonstrate a
"reasonable potential that the
issue triggering coverage will
be generated at trial." Id. at
112, 651 A.2d at 866. Because
Cochran had presented corroborating testimony and other
evidence supporting the potentiality of coverage, the court
found that Cochran's claim of
self-defense was not frivolous.
Id. at 112, 651 A.2d at 866.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Cochran clearly
reinforces the public policy concern that insurance policy holders should not be unreasonably
precluded from receiving the
coverage bargained for in their
insurance contracts. The court's
holding will make it considerably more difficult for insurers
to avoid their obligations to defend insureds, while simultaneously providing a safeguard
against frivolous claims of potential coverage.
- Jeffrey A. Friedman

Curry v. Hillcrest
Clinic, Inc.:

In Curry v. Hillcrest
Clinic, Inc., 337 Md. 412, 653
A.2d 934 (1995), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that
where a common basis of liability is alleged against co-defendants, one ofwhom has been
found in default, a finding in
favor ofthe non-defaulting codefendant automatically inures
to the benefit of the defaulting
co-defendant. In such cases,
despite an original order of default, damages cannot be assessed against the defaulting
co-defendant. Consequently,
the order in default must be
stricken. This holding signified the court of appeal's recognition, affirmance, and continued acceptance of the Frow

doctrine, first enunciated in the
United States Supreme Court
decision Frow v. De La Vega,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552 (1872).
Curry involved a malpractice claim filed with the
Health Claims Arbitration Office (HCAO) alleging the negligence and liability of Dr.
Sharma and the liability of
Hillcrest Clinic (Hillcrest),
Sharma's employer, under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Hillcrest failed to answer
Curry's complaint, and an order of default was entered by
the HCAO Director against
Hillcrest stating that the amount
of damages owed by Hillcrest
was to be determined by the
HCAO arbitration panel.

COURT OF APPEALS
REAFFIRMED
MARYLAND'S
ACCEPTANCE OF
THE "FROW
DOCTRINE" DEFAULTING
CO-DEFENDANTS
INURE TO THE
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CO-DEFENDANTS.
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The arbitration panel
held a hearing on the issue of
Sharma's liability to Curry at
which time Hillcrest was only
permitted to participate with
respect to the amount of damages. After the hearing, the
panel found that although
Sharma's actions in the matter
constituted negligence, such
negligence was not the proximate cause of Curry's injuries.
Therefore, no liability was
found on Sharma's part. The
panel ultimately concluded that
since Sharma's negligence was
not the proximate cause of Curry's injuries, no liability could
be entered against Hillcrest and
that the default order should be
stricken.
Curry then brought an
action in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County to nullify
HCAO's award, asserting that
she was entitled to a default
judgment against Hillcrest and
an award of damages. The circuit court vacated the HCAO's
award, noting that a defense
established by anon-defaulting
defendant inures to the benefit
of a co-defendant in default only
when the answering defense
precludes the claimant's entire
right of action, such as in a
statute of limitations defense.
However, the circuit court found
in Hillcrest's favor at the trial
on the merits as to its liability.
Curry appealed the circuit court's findings to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland, and Hillcrest cross-appealed the circuit court's decision to vacate HCAD's award.
The court of special appeals,

while finding it unnecessary to
address the issue of whether
Sharma's defense inured to the
benefit of Hillcrest, stated that
the force of the Frow doctrine
relied upon by the arbitration
panel was "questionable" in
Mary land. The court of appeals
granted cross-petitions for certiorari to consider the status of
this doctrine given the doubts
cast upon its continuing validity by the intermediate appellate
court.
After establishing the legitimacy of HCAO's action in
setting aside the judgment of
default against Hillcrest, the
court discussed the merits of
the Frow doctrine. The court,
in discussing the historical underpinnings of the doctrine,
noted that the Frow doctrine
was created out of a necessity to
prevent judicial absurdity. Curry at 429, 653 A.2d. at 942. In
cases like the present one, the
court explained that if a defendant in default did not inure to
the benefit of a judgment in
favor of a co-defendant, "there
might be one decree of the
court sustaining the charge ...
committed by the defendants;
and another decree disaffirming
the [same] charge." ld. (quoting Frow, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at
554). As with res judicata, the
courts rely on the Frow doctrine to prevent a separate finding on the same issue or claim
from contradicting the original
finding.
The court of appeals
rebutted the court of special
appeal's uncertainty as to the
status ofthe.doctrine by show-
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ing that its acceptance in Maryland dates back over 150 years.
The court cited Lingan v.
Henderson, which stated that
"where the defence made by
one defendant goes to the whole
cause of [the] complaint, and
the plaintiff fails to establish
his case in opposition to such
defense, he cannot be relieved
in anyway whatever, although
his claim should be confessed
by the other defendants." ld. at
431, 653 A.2d at 943 (quoting
Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland
236, 261 (Md. Ct. Chanco
1827)). The Lingan court went
on to state that since "every
Court of justice must act consistently, [the court] cannot be
allowed to contradict itself, by
saying, in the same decree, in
the same case, that the plaintiff
has no cause of suit whatever;
and also, that he has a just and
well founded cause of complaint." ld. at431-32, 653 A.2d
at 944 (quoting Lingan v.
Henderson, 1 Bland 236, 275
(Md. Ct. Chanco 1827)). In
summary, the court concluded
that Maryland law has historically recognized and accepted
the Frow doctrine. ld. at 433,
653 A.2d at 944.
Curry raised the issue,
however, that the doctrine may
not be applicable to modemjurisprudence. To support this
claim, Curry referred to and the
court recognized a Georgia case
, as having questioned the validity of the Frow doctrine. ld.
at 433, 653 A.2d at 944. In
Chenoweth Fred Chenoweth
EquipmentCo. v. Ocu/usCorp.,
the Supreme Court of Georgia
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held that the defendant should
not be relieved of his default
even if co-defendants go on to
prevail on the merits. Id.at433,
653 A.2d at 945 (citing Fred
Chenoweth Equipment Co. v.
Oculus Corp., 328 S.E.2d 539,
541 (Ga. 1985». The court of
appeals distinguished the Georgia ruling by noting that
Chenoweth relied on the
premise that a default judgment
is primarily a punitive measure
which needed to be enforced.
Id. at 434, 653 A.2d at 945. In
contrast, Maryland law "does
not weigh the balance so heavily against the truth seeking function ofadversary litigation." Id.
The court reasoned that although Chenoweth cast some
doubt upon the Frow doctrine,
Georgia and Mary land stand on
, , different footings as to their
analysis of the significance of
the doctrine. Id. Whereas Georgia law gives a great amount of
deference to enforcing default
judgments, Maryland law prefers a resolution to the matter
on the merits. Since the Frow
doctrine is premised upon consistency of judgments on the
merits, Maryland courts will
logically give the doctrine more
weight than Georgia courts.
The court also noted a
necessary requirement which
must be met to satisfy the Frow
doctrine -- that a finding of no
liability on the part of a nondefaulting co-defendant would
necessarily preclude a finding
of liability on the part of the codefendant in default. Id. at 430,
653 A.2d at 943. The court
reasoned that the doctrine "cer-
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tainly operates where the conduct of the defendant who appeared and successfully defended on the merits is the sole
basis for liability of a defaulting defendant." Id. (emphasis
added). In the instant case the
court stressed that a finding of
no liability on the part of
Sharma would necessarily dictate no liability on the part of
Hillcrest under a respondeat
superior claim. Id. at 435,653
A.2d at 945. Therefore, it was
clear to the court that the Frow
doctrine is certainly in effect
when a finding in favor of one
defendant, in the interest of
consistency, would necessarily preclude an adverse finding
as to any co-defendants.
By legitimizing the
Frow doctrine in light of modern legal analysis, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has effectively recreated significant
common law. In an era of
judicial activism and increased
skepticism of many common
law principles, the court found
applicable a doctrine which,
while incorporated into Maryland law over 150 years ago,
has not gained much consideration since then. In fact, the
court did not reference one relevant citation concerning the
Frow doctrine from this century. Further, in light of the
modem Georgia ruling on the
Frow doctrine in Chenoweth,
the court of appeals exercised
significant judicial restraint by
deferring to the common law.
The court's ruling is
quite logical in that it not only
avoids an absurd situation

________ .____ _

where one defendant may be
held liable even though the merits of the claim were found his
favor, but it also establishes a
certain amount ofjudiciaI economy. The court put an end to the
continued disposition of a case
where the merits of which had
already been determined. Also,
regarding the court's having distinguished Maryland law from
the Georgia law relied upon in
Chenoweth, it seems as though,
at least in situations such as the
one presented here, Maryland
law will defer to findings on the
substantive merits of a claim
rather than getting bogged down
in procedural niceties. By not
allowing damages to be imposed
upon Hillcrest, the court gave
more weight to the determination on the merits than to ajudgment of default. Accordingly,
Curry v. Hillcrest Clinic, Inc.
indicates a possible movement
of Maryland courts toward a
preference for disposing of procedural arguments where the
substantive merits of a claim are
clearly apparent.
- Paul J Cucuzzella

